Thursday, February 08, 2007
Our 2002 Flashback
Last night, it was thrilling to see the U.S. come through against Mexico under new coach Bob Bradley. There were so many things about this game that I liked, but the most striking experience I had was a constant flashback to the United States World Cup run to the quarterfinals in 2002.
Maybe it was the fact that (just like World Cup 2002) the match aired after my early bedtime and that I was watching it on a small TV with the sound down (so as not to wake the baby or wife) sent us on our trip down memory lane. More likely, perhaps, was the fact that there was never a moment that the U.S. were in control of the game and in fact it seemed like they were constantly on the verge of conceding a goal, which seemed to be the dominating feeling during all of the 2002 victories. However, the U.S. was successful in 2002 and last evening by mounting a serious counterattack (especially in the second half) and scoring on set pieces. It seems that with the U.S.'s historically lacking firepower, these are the ways to score.
Differences from World Cup 2002 included the standout play of both center-halves, Conrad and Bocanegra. In Korea, Eddie Pope played well but Brad Friedel was often saving Jeff Agoos's bacon. Also, the lack of Brian McBride up front is going to be a real difficulty to overcome (maybe he can be coaxed back into the fold for either the Gold Cup, or more importantly Copa America.)
Thoughts from last night:
1. Right back is a real head-scratcher; Chris Albright was getting flayed alive over there and Josh Gros didn't prove much better. If I recall from WC 2006, we had similar problems with Pavel Nedved operating on the flank, which I believe is one reason Beasley wasn't his dominant self during the tournament (because he was forced into serious defensive duty). This leads me to think that Cherundolo isn't necessarily the answer.
That said, it'll be interesting to watch the spot this summer. If Cherundolo isn't the solution, then maybe Bocanegra will shift over to make room for Onyewu in the middle (we're assuming Conrad's performance last night has locked down the other center half position and it appears that Bornstein may have locked down left back). If not, maybe Marvell Wynne deserves a look. I know the rap on him is that he's all speed, but we've got to get a reliable option in over there. Of course, those scenarios don't take into account Jonathan Spector or Jay DeMerit; Spector is probably a better bet to play the right side than Bocanegra.
2. I like the 4-4-2 that Bob Bradley is playing. Defensive midfield is a strong position for the United States, with Mastroeni (who, if for no other reason, deserves to be praised for not getting booked) and Clark acquitting themselves well last night, and Michael Bradley and Benny Feilhaber both pushing for inclusion into the squad. Similarly, we have two excellent left-wingers (Convey and Beasley) who can play the attacking role that Convey played last night and Clint Dempsey, Freddy Adu, and Beasley have all attacked from the right side (as has Donovan for that matter). Landon Donovan as one of the two forwards finally worked last night (it was his best game in a long time). Which brings me to my next point.
3. The U.S. needs a target man. With McBride gone (prematurely - he's dominating the EPL), our limited scoring options have become even more limited. Some great teams play without a target forward, but these teams are all more fluid and less reliant on crosses from the wings. We are not good enough to operate with two undersized, ball-control-oriented forwards (see last night). Eddie Johnson may qualify as a target man; he certainly brings speed to the table. That said, I'd love to see Kenny Cooper, Josmer Altidore, and even Conor Casey (now back on this side of the Atlantic) get a shot to partner with Donovan. If Johnson goes to Europe and turns it around, he may be the long term answer, but we need some insurance.
4. Finally, I think I figured out why the 2006 World Cup strategy was such a disaster. We had too much confidence in our defense. Donovan and Beasley were being killed in the media for pulling the ball back and losing their aggressiveness, but I have to believe that they were instructed to do so. The lesson that we have to learn is that we're not good enough to sit back and wait and judiciously counterattack. The United States has speed on the wings and some creative players up front, as well as some good tacklers in the center of the field, and usually excellent goalkeeping. It strikes me that these strengths point to a strategy of consistent counterattacking with abandon from our wing players, culminating in as many shots on goal on possible. It doesn't matter if they're good shots; we're not good enough to pick and choose.
A ball control offense is not the way for the United States to win. Strong center-half play (like Pope provided in 2002 and Conrad provided last evening) and excellent goalkeeping can protect from getting caught with our backs and wings too far forward. Strong tacklers in the midfield can disrupt the other team's fluidity and create the turnovers necessary for the counterattack. Speedy wings are essential to this attack, and I believe a target man is crucial as well. It looks like we have the pieces in place to execute this strategy and I really like the direction of the team.
*Another note - perhaps the dumbest thing the U.S. did at World Cup 2006 was the quick restart on free kicks. This seemed designed to keep possession, but extended possession resulted in no chances. When we have a player with the capabilities of McBride and fullbacks who can score like Onyewu and Bocanegra, there is no excuse for not taking every opportunity to put a cross in the box on a setpiece. Thinking about this now just makes my blood boil.
** Final note - one other thing that would help this strategy is a central midfielder with a fearsome long range shot. Apparently Ricardo Clark might have one. When a counterattack breaks down in the middle of the field, the long blast is always an option; it also helps either directly on a free kick or on the rebound after a set piece.
Maybe it was the fact that (just like World Cup 2002) the match aired after my early bedtime and that I was watching it on a small TV with the sound down (so as not to wake the baby or wife) sent us on our trip down memory lane. More likely, perhaps, was the fact that there was never a moment that the U.S. were in control of the game and in fact it seemed like they were constantly on the verge of conceding a goal, which seemed to be the dominating feeling during all of the 2002 victories. However, the U.S. was successful in 2002 and last evening by mounting a serious counterattack (especially in the second half) and scoring on set pieces. It seems that with the U.S.'s historically lacking firepower, these are the ways to score.
Differences from World Cup 2002 included the standout play of both center-halves, Conrad and Bocanegra. In Korea, Eddie Pope played well but Brad Friedel was often saving Jeff Agoos's bacon. Also, the lack of Brian McBride up front is going to be a real difficulty to overcome (maybe he can be coaxed back into the fold for either the Gold Cup, or more importantly Copa America.)
Thoughts from last night:
1. Right back is a real head-scratcher; Chris Albright was getting flayed alive over there and Josh Gros didn't prove much better. If I recall from WC 2006, we had similar problems with Pavel Nedved operating on the flank, which I believe is one reason Beasley wasn't his dominant self during the tournament (because he was forced into serious defensive duty). This leads me to think that Cherundolo isn't necessarily the answer.
That said, it'll be interesting to watch the spot this summer. If Cherundolo isn't the solution, then maybe Bocanegra will shift over to make room for Onyewu in the middle (we're assuming Conrad's performance last night has locked down the other center half position and it appears that Bornstein may have locked down left back). If not, maybe Marvell Wynne deserves a look. I know the rap on him is that he's all speed, but we've got to get a reliable option in over there. Of course, those scenarios don't take into account Jonathan Spector or Jay DeMerit; Spector is probably a better bet to play the right side than Bocanegra.
2. I like the 4-4-2 that Bob Bradley is playing. Defensive midfield is a strong position for the United States, with Mastroeni (who, if for no other reason, deserves to be praised for not getting booked) and Clark acquitting themselves well last night, and Michael Bradley and Benny Feilhaber both pushing for inclusion into the squad. Similarly, we have two excellent left-wingers (Convey and Beasley) who can play the attacking role that Convey played last night and Clint Dempsey, Freddy Adu, and Beasley have all attacked from the right side (as has Donovan for that matter). Landon Donovan as one of the two forwards finally worked last night (it was his best game in a long time). Which brings me to my next point.
3. The U.S. needs a target man. With McBride gone (prematurely - he's dominating the EPL), our limited scoring options have become even more limited. Some great teams play without a target forward, but these teams are all more fluid and less reliant on crosses from the wings. We are not good enough to operate with two undersized, ball-control-oriented forwards (see last night). Eddie Johnson may qualify as a target man; he certainly brings speed to the table. That said, I'd love to see Kenny Cooper, Josmer Altidore, and even Conor Casey (now back on this side of the Atlantic) get a shot to partner with Donovan. If Johnson goes to Europe and turns it around, he may be the long term answer, but we need some insurance.
4. Finally, I think I figured out why the 2006 World Cup strategy was such a disaster. We had too much confidence in our defense. Donovan and Beasley were being killed in the media for pulling the ball back and losing their aggressiveness, but I have to believe that they were instructed to do so. The lesson that we have to learn is that we're not good enough to sit back and wait and judiciously counterattack. The United States has speed on the wings and some creative players up front, as well as some good tacklers in the center of the field, and usually excellent goalkeeping. It strikes me that these strengths point to a strategy of consistent counterattacking with abandon from our wing players, culminating in as many shots on goal on possible. It doesn't matter if they're good shots; we're not good enough to pick and choose.
A ball control offense is not the way for the United States to win. Strong center-half play (like Pope provided in 2002 and Conrad provided last evening) and excellent goalkeeping can protect from getting caught with our backs and wings too far forward. Strong tacklers in the midfield can disrupt the other team's fluidity and create the turnovers necessary for the counterattack. Speedy wings are essential to this attack, and I believe a target man is crucial as well. It looks like we have the pieces in place to execute this strategy and I really like the direction of the team.
*Another note - perhaps the dumbest thing the U.S. did at World Cup 2006 was the quick restart on free kicks. This seemed designed to keep possession, but extended possession resulted in no chances. When we have a player with the capabilities of McBride and fullbacks who can score like Onyewu and Bocanegra, there is no excuse for not taking every opportunity to put a cross in the box on a setpiece. Thinking about this now just makes my blood boil.
** Final note - one other thing that would help this strategy is a central midfielder with a fearsome long range shot. Apparently Ricardo Clark might have one. When a counterattack breaks down in the middle of the field, the long blast is always an option; it also helps either directly on a free kick or on the rebound after a set piece.
